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AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC 




Total factor productivity (TFP), factor accumulation, and growth are analyzed for a panel 
of 40 countries in 2001-2011. TFP growth and technical inefficiency are estimated using 
a stochastic frontier model. Environmental variables are found to have an important role 
in explaining differences in inefficiency across countries. Over 2001-2011, the general 
improvement in technical efficiency of countries is almost outweighed by technological 
regress. Results indicate that differences in factor accumulation between OECD and 
emergent economies are more important than differences in TFP change to explain 
differences in economic growth. Results also indicate negative and significant random 
shocks for the OECD countries. 
 
Keywords: Economic growth, total factor productivity, technical efficiency, 
environmental variables, stochastic frontier analysis. 






Jones and Romer (2010) select the large differences in income across countries as one of 
the new stylized facts of growth.1 Why are some countries far richer than others? In order 
to understand the enormous disparities in economic performance across countries, we 
should investigate first the determinants of economic growth, that is, factors that explain 
the increase in a country’s income per capita over a long period of time.  
Determining the sources of discrepancies in the levels of production, and consequently 
in the standards of living, across countries, is a demanding and complex challenge that 
several studies have tried to address. The lively debate that one has witnessed is based on 
the relative importance of factor accumulation or productivity contribution to differences 
in economic performance. Simply put, ),( typroductivifactorsfoutput= , where factors 
include physical and human capital, and economists do not seem to agree on which 
variable (factors or productivity) contributes more to differences in income levels and 
growth rates. According to Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), this debate is of great 
importance because the implications of each view (the factors or the productivity view) 
can differ substantially. 
The purposes of this paper are threefold. First, differences in technical inefficiency are 
estimated and explained. Second, TFP change is estimated and decomposed into various 
components in order to evaluate the relative contribution of each component to 
productivity growth. Third, the relative importance of TFP growth and factor 
accumulation to economic growth is also evaluated. The sample is a balanced panel 
consisting of 34 OECD countries plus 6 emergent economies (Brazil, China, India, 
Indonesia, Russian Federation and South Africa) for the time period 2001-2011. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review. Section 3 
describes the data, the stochastic frontier model used in the empirical analysis as well as 
the decomposition of TFP growth. The empirical results are discussed in section 4 and 
concluding remarks are presented in section 5. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
One of the most famous attempts to explain the determinants of economic growth is 
presented by Solow (1956, 1957), which established the roots of the neoclassic theory of 
 
1According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, in 2011, USA’s output per worker 
(converted to 1990 constant international dollars using PPP rates) was approximately 7.5 times higher than 
output per worker in India. 
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economic growth. In his 1956’s seminal article, Solow proposes his neoclassical model, 
which can be seen as an extension of the Harrod-Domar model. He argues that, in order 
to sustain long-term economic growth, there must be continuous advances in technology 
in order to outweigh the effects of diminishing returns that would in due course cause 
economic growth to cease. Solow (1957) establishes the accounting framework for 
explaining income growth and the empirical results indicate that the growth rate of TFP, 
measured as a residual term (the Solow residual), has a predominant role in determining 
the growth rate of GDP per capita. Following the same line of thought, Kuznets (1971) 
concludes that the high rate of productivity growth accounts for most of the growth of 
output per capita. Even if hidden costs and inputs are considered, growth in productivity 
accounts for more than half of the growth in output per capita (Kuznets, 1971). 
Consequently, if the rate of change of productivity exerts such enormous influence on the 
growth rate of GDP per capita, as advocated by these two authors, it can be concluded, 
according to the Solow´s model, that most of the economic growth is exogenously 
determined. Therefore, reliance on the exogenous technological progress as an essential 
variable to explain economic growth poses one of the biggest limitations of the 
neoclassical approach. This point of view was first expressed by Moses Abramovitz, who 
dubbed this term “a measure of our ignorance about the causes of economic growth” 
(Abramovitz, 1956).  
Latter attempts to scrutinize the content of the Solow residual gave rise to a new set of 
theories named “endogenous growth theories”. By endogenizing a country’s technology, 
these theories advocate that factor accumulation is not sufficient to explain differences in 
income growth and try to explain the differences in the growth of the residual by 
analyzing the choices of the public and private sector.2 As an example, in Romer’s (1990) 
model, growth is motivated by technological change that emerges from deliberate 
investment decisions made by profit-maximizing agents. According to its defenders, these 
theories provide policymakers with more relevant information regarding the determinants 
of long-run economic growth than the standard neoclassical framework. 
However, in the recent past there has been a plethora of empirical studies that 
contradict the idea that physical and human capital accumulation is not sufficient to 
 
2 The neoclassical framework postulates that a common (exogenously determined) technology is shared by 
every country due to the non-rivalry and non-exclusivity nature of the technological progress (note that the 
growth of the residual, that is the growth of productivity, essentially mirrors this technological progress). 
Consequently, technological progress cannot explain differences in GDP per capita across countries and 
one has to look for differences in factor accumulation. 
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explain differences in levels and growth rates of output per capita. Mankiw et al. (1992) 
conclude that the augmented Solow model (an extension of the original neoclassical 
Solow model that includes human as well as physical capital) provides a very good picture 
of the cross-country data. They predicted that the augmented Solow model accounts about 
80% for the cross-country variance in income in 1985. Young (1995) documents the 
fundamental role played by factor accumulation (rather than the rise in productivity) in 
explaining the astonishing post-war growth of the East Asian countries. Klenow and 
Rodriguez-Clare (1997) call these set of studies the “neoclassical revival”, mainly 
because they advocate that differences in physical and human capital are the main 
contributors to the differences in the level and growth rate of GDP. 
According to Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), this debate is of great importance 
because the implications of each view (the factors or the productivity view) can differ 
substantially. For instance, technology-based models of productivity, by assuming scale 
effects due to the non-rival nature of technology creation and adoption, indicate that 
international trade openness can have direct effects on per capita income levels and 
growth rates. The neoclassical approach does not share this view, and assumes that the 
production frontier is common across countries. More recently, this crucial assumption is 
again questioned by several empirical studies – Knight et al. (1993), Islam (1995) and 
Caselli et al. (1996), to name a few – which show that the income-convergence predicted 
by the neoclassical framework is occurring but conditioned on the existence of differences 
in the production frontier across countries. In fact, by analyzing recent contributions to 
the economic growth literature, one can observe an increasing focus on TFP growth as 
the main driver of long-term income growth and cross-country differences in per capita 
income. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) uses the Mincer-regression to estimate the 
levels and growth rates of human capital and find out that differences in the level and 
growth rate of the TFP play a fundamental role in explaining the differences in income 
levels and growth rates. Hall and Jones (1999) focus on levels instead of growth rates and 
calculate the TFP level as the Solow residual. Differences in physical and human capital 
can only partially explain differences in GDP per worker and most of the variance in 
income per capita is due to a large fluctuation in the level of the Solow residual across 
countries (Hall and Jones, 1999). Easterly and Levine (2001) identify TFP as the main 
contributor to the cross-country differences in the level and growth rate of per capita 
income and named it a stylized factor. In 2013, the Organization for Economic Co-
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operation and Development (OECD) identified productivity growth as the key factor to 
improve per capita income and hence standards of living. 
The results in recent economic growth literature, by favoring the importance of 
productivity over factor accumulation in explaining the differences in income levels and 
growth, reinforce the need of a better understanding of TFP and its determinants in order 
to design policies most conducive to TFP growth, and therefore, long-run economic 
growth. Consequently, several authors have tried to address this issue. These studies 
emphasize the importance of institutions and government policies (e.g., Hall and Jones, 
1999; Acemoglu et al., 2004; Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2013; Christie, 2014; Hu et al., 
2014; Bayraktar and Moreno-Dodson, 2015), human capital (e.g., Barro, 2001; Aiyar and 
Feyrer, 2002; Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2013), trade openness (e.g., Edwards, 1998; 
Baldwin and Gu, 2004; Dollar and Kraay, 2004), and the role of natural resources (e.g., 
Delíktas and Bacilar, 2005), in boosting productivity growth. 
 
 
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
This section describes the data and discusses the specification of the stochastic production 
frontier model as well as the decomposition of TFP change. 
 
III.1 Description of the Sample 
The sample includes 34 OECD countries plus 6 emergent economies in the time period 2001-
2011. In spite of evident differences between OECD countries and emergent economies, 
both set of economies play an extremely important role in the global economy.3 In fact, 
these countries as a whole account for approximately 90% of the world GDP and 64% of 
the world’s population (Table 1). The rationale underlying the choice of the countries is 
the following: the sample must include countries with size or strategic importance that 
make them crucial players in the global market (Table 2).  
Note that our sample does not include poor countries. According to Pires and Garcia 
(2012), the exclusion of poor countries does not lead to a selection bias, if the parametric 
functional form specification of the production frontier is flexible by allowing the output 
elasticity with respect to each input to vary across countries and over time. The empirical 
model, presented below, specifies a translog stochastic production frontier. 
 
3 By “Emergent economies” we are referring to the economies of Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russian 





GDP per capita and GDP per worker in 2011 
 
TABLE 2 
GDP per capita growth and GDP growth in 2011 
 
Country 
Population growth  
(annual %) 






 World 1,18 1,59 2,79  
      OECD members 0,67 1,04 1,71  
      Emergent economies 0,88 3,72 7,00  
            Brazil 0,88 1,83 2,73  
            China 0,48 8,78 9,30  
            India 1,28 5,28 6,64  
            Indonesia 1,29 5,12 6,49  
            Russia Federation 0,40 3,85 4,26  
            South Africa 1,33 2,23 3,60  
      
Source: World Bank  (2015) 
 
The time period considered in the analysis is 2001-2011, mainly for two reasons. First, 
the impacts of the last decade of globalization and the global financial crisis are 
investigated by specifying it as an environmental variable in the technical inefficiency 
model. Second, the euro was introduced in January 1999 in eleven countries and the 
physical euro coins and notes replaced the old national currencies in the eurozone in 2002. 
Inclusion of years previous to 2001 would reflect structural changes different from the 
ones we aim to analyze. 2011 is the last year for which the desired data was available. 



















 World 6.964,64 100 54.024.630,72 100 7.756,99 18.551,59 
      OECD members 1.248,58 17,93 39.502.455,53 73,12 31.637,91 47.649,46 
      Emergent economies 3.200,56 45,95 8.299.961,87 15,36 24.032,35 80.887 
           Brazil 196,94 2,83 1.126.722,92 2,09 5.721,29 13.592 
           China 1.344,13 19,30 4.196.333,19 7,77 3.121,97 14.203 
           India 1.221,16 17,53 1.326.235,11 2,45 1.086,05 8.875 
           Indonesia 243,8 3,50 402.408,02 0,74 1.650,56 11.002 
           Russian Federation 142,96 2,05 948.019,77 1,75 6.631,53 19.012 
             South Africa 51,58 0,74 300.242,87 0,56 5.820,96 14.203 
 
  
Source: World Bank  (2015) 













Source: World Bank (2013) 
 
Table 3 provides summary statistics of the variables used in the estimation of the 
stochastic production frontier with time-varying inefficiency. The variables considered 
are the following: the real GDP per worker (y) at current PPPs (in 10 thousands 
2005US$); the index of human capital per worker (h); the capital stock per worker (k) at 
current PPPs (in 10 thousands 2005US$); and a vector (z) of environmental variables to 
explain cross-country differences in inefficiency. The index of human capital per worker 
(h) is constructed using data on the average years of schooling for the working-age 
population from Barro and Lee (2013) and rates of return associated with different years 
of education (Psacharopoulos, 1994). The capital stock per worker (k) is obtained by 
dividing the capital stock at current PPPs by the number of workers. The components of 
vector z and their definition are as follows: 
- eagricultur is the value added of agriculture measured as a percentage of GDP; 
- esnatresourc is the total rents from natural resources as a percentage of GDP; 
- tariffsis the weighted average of tariff rates of all products (%); 
- lifexpect is the number of years of life expectancy at birth; 
- timeinsolv is the number of years necessary to resolve an insolvency; 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Real GDP per worker (y) 5.33 2.36 0.50 11.67 
Index of human capital per worker (h) 2.96 0.39 1.76 3.62 
Capital stock per worker (k) 17.22 8.75 0.91 38.03 
     
Environmental variables (z):     
     Agriculture 3.95 3.79 0.30 22.92 
     Natresources 3.45 6.01 0.00 38.41 
     Tariffs 2.76 2.58 0.00 26.50 
     Lifexpect 76.82 5.65 51.56 85.16 
     Timeinsolv 2.15 1.44 0.40 10.00 
     Patents 24.46 69.49 0.00 415.83 
     Regulatory 1.10 0.62 -0.78 1.97 
     Urban 73.17 14.59 27.98 97.49 
     Govdebt 52.63 28.18 3.61 189.83 
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- regulatoryis a composite index reflecting regulatory quality, assuming values 
between -2.5 and 2.5, where higher values correspond to better outcomes; 
- patents is the resident patent applications measured in thousands of units; 
- urban  is the urban population as a percentage of the total population; 
- govdebt is the total central government debt as a percentage of GDP; 
- dEUcrisis is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 for the 27-EU countries 
for the years 2009 to 2011 and 0 otherwise. 
 
 The environmental variables, which were collected from the World Development  
Indicators database from World Bank, attempt to reflect countries’ specific characteristics 
that may influence technical inefficiency and productivity change, and that can help to 
design policies most conducive to TFP growth. Several studies have tried to address this 
issue. These studies emphasize the importance of institutions and government policies 
(e.g., Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2004; Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2013), human 
capital (e.g., Barro, 2001; Aiyar and Feyrer, 2002; Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2013), trade 
openness (e.g., Edwards, 1998; Baldwin and Gu, 2003; Dollar and Kraay, 2004), the roles 
of natural resources (e.g., Deliktas and Bacilar, 2005), among others, in boosting 
productivity growth. The environmental variables considered in this study are: economic 
structure, trade, demography, institutions, innovation, urbanization, government finance 
and the global financial crisis.  
         The economic structure of a country is captured by the value added of the agriculture 
sector and the total rents from natural resources as a percentage of GDP. Both variables 
are good proxies of the weight of the primary sector in an economy and the contribution 
of total natural resources rents to GDP is an important basis for the analysis of the 
sustainability of economic growth. Trade is represented by the weighted average of tariff 
rates, considering that not all countries set equal tariffs to all products, and may set high 
tariffs to protect favored domestic sectors. Life expectancy at birth is an important 
demographic variable indicating the health status of a country and, according to the World 
Bank, it is one of the most frequently used indicators to compare socioeconomic 
development across countries.  
         Institutions can be defined as the rules and organizations that set the production 
environment (Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu, 2008). The quality of a country’s 
institutions is captured by the variables time to resolve insolvency, which mirrors the 
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quality of the business environment, and regulatory quality, which reflects the governance 
of a country. The selection of both variables required the construction of two correlation 
matrices. The first matrix included all variables in the World Bank Doing Business Index 
as well as the real GDP per worker, while the second matrix included all variables of the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators plus the output variable. Each of the correlation matrix 
indicates that it is better to include only one variable reflecting business environment and 
one reflecting the governance of a country in order to avoid multicollinearity problems 
and the variables time to resolve insolvency and regulatory quality were appropriate 
choices given the strong correlation with GDP per worker. 
         Innovation is represented by the resident patent applications. A correlation matrix 
of all indicators of the Global Innovation Index and the real GDP per worker was 
constructed and the analysis resulted in the selection of this variable. 
        Urban population, measured as a percentage of the total population reflects the 
degree of development of a country. In principle, cities generate jobs and income, and 
deliver education, health care and other services more efficiently than rural areas. The 
government finance is represented by the central government debt measured as a 
percentage of the GDP. High levels of public debt are likely to have a negative impact on 
economic growth, although this effect may be relevant only after a certain threshold.  
      The effects of the global crisis on the economic performance of countries are 
represented by a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 for the 27-EU countries for the 
time period 2009-2011 and 0 otherwise. This variable attempts to differentiate the impact 
that the crisis had on the 27-EU countries in comparison with other regions, given that 
those effects were seriously aggravated after the financial crisis turned into a sovereign 
debt crisis in 2009, leading to high constraints on public finances and fiscal sustainability 





III.2 A Stochastic Frontier Time-Varying Inefficiency Model 
This study uses the Battese and Coelli (1995) stochastic production frontier model for 
(balanced/unbalanced) panel data assuming a translog functional form. For an overview 
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of stochastic frontier models, see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) and Kumbhakar et al. 
(2015).   















           (1) 
and technical inefficiency is modeled as a function of environmental variables: 
                                                          
ititit wzu +=           (2) 
where t is the year of observation, ),0(~
2
vit Niidv  , itu  is the non-negative random 




 truncated at 
zero, and itw  is a random variable defined by the truncation of the normal distribution 
with zero mean and variance 
2
w . The time index t is also a component of the z vector. 
Time- and country-specific technical inefficiency is estimated as follows: 
)ˆexp( itit uTE −= .           (3) 
The empirical model specified in (1) and (2) is estimated using the Maximum 
Likelihood method. The likelihood function and its partial derivatives with respect to the 
parameters of the model are presented in Battese and Coelli (1992). 
Several alternative specifications of the model in (1) and (2) were tested using the 
likelihood ratio test statistics. All tests favored the adoption of a translog production 
frontier with Hicks-neutral technological change and inefficiency effects, itu , specified as 
a linear function of the environmental variables. The results of these testes are presented 
in Appendix A. Variable 𝑡 is present in both equations (1) and (2) in order to include both 
technical change and time-varying inefficiency effects. Similarly to the original Battese 
and Coelli (1995) model, the t variable in equation (1) accounts for Hicks-neutral 
 
4 Globalization, in recent decades, has led to free capital mobility (FDI and portfolio investment) and a 
worldwide increase in human capital as well as to integrated production processes across countries and/or 
Global Value Chains (see for instance WTO Made in the World). These facts may be particularly relevant 
for OECD countries and emerging economies, which became more connected than ever in recent decades, 
and support the choice of a common production frontier. In other words, no technological gap between the 
OECD and emergent countries in the sample is assumed in this study. 
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technical change, while the t variable in equation (2) specifies that the inefficiency effects 
may change, ceteris paribus, linearly with time. The presence of this variable in both 
equations and the distributional assumptions on the inefficiency effects allow 
disentangling the effects of technical change and inefficiency change. 
Given the empirical model specified in (1) and (2), TFP change is decomposed into 
three components, as follows (e.g., Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000)): 
                                         ++= STETTFP                                                (4) 
where 
                                                  tT ttt  +=                                                                (5) 

















                                            (6) 
                                                  )ln()ln( kh hkhhhh  ++=  (7) 
                                                  )ln()ln( hk hkkkkk  ++=  (8) 
                                                  )ln()()ln()( kh hkkkhkhhkh  ++++=  (9) 























 )1(  (10) 
Equation (5) shows that technical change varies only over time due to Hicks-neutral 
technological change. 0T  indicates an upward shift in the production frontier (i.e., 
technological progress), 0T  represents a downward shift in the production frontier 
(i.e., technological regress) and 0=T means that the frontier remains unchanged. 
Technical efficiency change varies across countries and over time, as shown in equation 
(6), where 0TE  means that the country moves towards the production frontier (i.e., 
the country becomes more efficient), 0TE represents a movement away of the 
frontier, and 0=TE  means that the position of the country in relation to the production 
frontier remains unchanged. Output elasticity with respect to each input (equations (7) 
and (8)) and the scale elasticity (equation (9)) vary over time and across countries. 
Consequently, the scale economies component, S , varies over time and across countries. 
The impact of the scale component on productivity change depends on the type of 
technology and the aggregate input rate. Under constant returns to scale, the aggregated 
input growth rate has no effect on productivity change. The scale economies component 
has a positive effect on TFP change if 1  and the aggregated input growth rate is 
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positive or in the case of input contraction and 1 . Note that TFP change in equation 
(4) is expected to vary over time and across countries. 
Moreover, the decomposition in (4) allows separating the explained components 
of economic growth from the random shocks. The random shocks component is obtained 
residually, by subtracting the sum of the growth rate of inputs per worker, weighted by 
the corresponding expenditure share, and the growth rate of TFP from the growth rate of 
GDP per worker.  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
IV.1 Estimates of the stochastic production frontier  
The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the model specified in (1)-(2) are 
presented in Table 4.5 All parameters are significant at 5%. The elasticity of output per 
worker with respect to human capital per worker (physical capital per worker), evaluated 
at the sample mean, is 0.24 (0.59). Therefore, the elasticity of scale, measured at the 
sample mean, is equal to 0.83, which reflects decreasing returns to scale. Results on the 
Allen partial elasticity of substitution between human and physical capital per worker are 
presented in Appendix B. The elasticity of substitution between the two input factors, 
measured at the sample mean, is approximately 0.1, suggesting that both inputs are 
substitutes and strongly inelastic. Thus, these input factors have limited substitution 
possibilities.  
The coefficient 𝛽𝑡 is negative and more than offsets the positive effect coming from 
the positive sign and magnitude of 𝛽𝑡𝑡, contributing to a negative technical change every 
year. This indicates technological regress over the period 2001-2011, with an estimated 
annual rate of -7.07%.  
 
5 The Bartlett’s test for equal variances was conducted for the technical efficiency scores as well as for the 
estimates of the symmetric error term. Results of the Bartlett´s tests indicate that u is not heteroscedastic, 
yet the hypothesis of v being heteroscedastic cannot be rejected. Thus, the estimates of the frontier function 
parameters are consistent, except the intercept which is downward biased. As a tentative solution, we 
estimated model 2 in Kumbhakar et al. (2014), which allows to modelling the heteroscedasticity of v, by 
specifying the standard deviation of v as a function of environmental variables. However, the available 
environmental variables are scarce and, after several attempts, the heteroscedasticity problem of v remained 
(we checked it using the Bartlett’s test). For this reason, we do not change the specification of the frontier 
model presented in section III.2. By doing so, the estimates of technical efficiency are, in fact, 
underestimated (due to the bias of the intercept). However, the technical inefficiency estimates are relatively 
unbiased, since the heteroscedasticity of v affects only the constant term of the frontier function. In other 






Estimates of the stochastic frontier time-varying inefficiency model 
 
Number of observations = 440 
Observations per country: Minimum = 11 
Number of countries = 40                                 Maximum = 11 
Number of years = 11                              Average = 11 
Log Likelihood = 217.0422 
Prob> χ2 = 0.0000 
Wald χ2 (7) = 628.00 
ln y Coefficients 
Standard 
Error 
z P > |𝑧| 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
Frontier       
𝑙𝑛 (ℎ) 𝛽ℎ -5.809128 1.147038 -5.06 0.000 -8.057282 -3.560974 
𝑙𝑛 (𝑘) 𝛽𝑘 0.7064641 0.1479122 4.78 0.000 0.4165614 0.9963668 
𝑡 𝛽𝑡 -0.0981486 0.0253975 -3.86 0.000 -0.1479267 -0.0483704 
1
2
(𝑙𝑛(ℎ))2 𝛽ℎℎ 4.113806 1.469301 2.80 0.005 1.234029 6.993583 
1
2
(𝑙𝑛(𝑘))2 𝛽𝑘𝑘 -0.2920147 0.0573869 -5.09 0.000 -0.4044909 -0.1795384 
1
2
𝑡2 𝛽𝑡𝑡 0.0045607 0.0020993 2.17 0.030 0.0004461 0.0006754 
𝑙𝑛(ℎ) ∗ 𝑙𝑛 (𝑘) 𝛽ℎ𝑘 .6141446 0.2106014 2.81 0.005 0.1856937 1.042595 
Const. 𝛽0 3.753954 0.51971394 7.22 0.000 2.735283 4.772624 
Μ       
Agriculture 𝛿1 0.0307487 0.0054211 5.67 0000 0.0201235 0.0413738 
Nat Resources 𝛿2 0.0048014 0.0016155 2.97 0.003 0.0016351 0.0079677 
Tariffs 𝛿3 0.014778 0.0035337 4.18 0.000 0.0078522 0.0217039 
Life expect 𝛿4 -0.0035429 0.0023082 -1.53 0.125 -0.0080669 0.000981 
Time insolv 𝛿5 0.0497739 0.0065565 7.59 0.000 0.0369234 0.0626244 
Regulatory 𝛿6 -0.1080597 0.0233531 -4.63 0.000 -0.153831 -0.0622885 
Patents 𝛿7 0.0007503 0.000132 5.68 0.000 0.0004915 0.0010091 
Urban 𝛿8 -0.0008899 0.0008697 -1.02 0.306 -0.0025944 0.0008146 
Gov debt 𝛿9 0.0008052 0.0003302 2.44 0.015 0.0001581 0.0014524 
dEUcrisis 𝛿10 0.1145139 0.0360738 3.17 0.002 0.0438106 0.1852172 
𝑡 𝛿11 -0.0623471 0.0182371 -3.42 0.001 -0.0980911 -0.026603 
Const. 𝛿0 0.9465922 0.2487099 3.81 0.000 0.4591297 1.434055 
𝜎𝑢 0.1154147 0.0237713 4.98 0.000 0.0798969 0.1755017 




















 u= , where 222 vu  += , is approximately 
0.6, meaning that 60% of the total composed error variance is explained by the variance 
of u. This reflects the importance of incorporating technical inefficiency in the model.  
The standard errors of u and v  are statistically different from 0, indicating that 
inefficiency effects are stochastic and the traditional production function does not fit the 
data well.6 
 
IV.2 Technical inefficiency estimates  
The set of country-specific variables considered in the technical inefficiency model, 
specified in (2), explains partially the differences in inefficiency (and productivity 
growth) across countries and over time. All parameters, except 𝛿4 and 𝛿8, are statistically 
significant at 5% (Table 4).  
The weight of agriculture in the economy has a positive effect in inefficiency (𝛿1 >
0), suggesting that the higher the contribution of the agricultural sector to the economy 
as a whole, ceteris paribus, the higher is the inefficiency of a country. Ceteris paribus, 
countries with a lower weight of the primary sector are expected to be more efficient, and 
hence, more productive. The impact of agriculture in the productivity of a country is still 
a controversial topic in the literature. Some authors believe that agriculture is the reason 
for the huge difference between the productivity growth of central and peripheral 
countries. 7  Prebisch (1984), for example, argues that peripheral countries have low 
productivity growth because they focus in supplying primary goods. Jaumotte and 
Spatafora (2007) find out that the transition of economic activity from agricultural to non-
agricultural sectors has two types of sectorial effects: (i) the sectorial reallocation effect 
which reflects an increase in aggregate TFP due to the reallocation of resources from a 
low-productivity to a high-productivity sector; and (ii) the sectorial composition effect 
which reflects the increase in TFP growth when a country’s value added comes mainly 
from high-productivity growth sectors. Chanda and Dalgaard (2008) argued that 30 to 
50% of cross-country variation in TFP is due to differences in the sectorial composition 
 
6 According to Battese and Coelli (1995), if 𝜎𝑢 and 𝜎𝑣 are not statistically different from zero, the model 
would reduce to a traditional mean response function with the z-variables belonging to the production 
function. 




of GDP. In particular, the allocation of resources between non-agricultural and 
agricultural sectors affects productivity growth, with agricultural shares affecting 
negatively TFP. Other studies (e.g., Krueger et al., 1988; Restuccia et al., 2008) argue 
that the sources of low productivity in the agriculture sector are due to the low economy-
wide productivity in those countries and the imposition of barriers to the use of modern 
intermediate inputs that could, otherwise, lead to an improvement of productivity in this 
sector. On the other hand, some other studies report much higher TFP growth rates for 
agriculture relative to other sectors, creating, therefore, the need to reevaluate the 
association of low levels of TFP growth to the modern agriculture (e.g., OECD, 1995; 
Bernard and Jones, 1996; Martin and Mitra, 2001).8  
Resource abundance has a negative impact on the efficiency of a country (𝛿2 > 0). 
This result is consistent with the evidence that shows that countries with high stocks of 
natural resources tend to be less productive and grow slower than resource-poor countries. 
Sachs and Warner (2001) named it a “curse of natural resources”. Several reasons are 
pointed out to explain this result. In particular, Sachs and Warner (1995) mention that 
laziness is associated with resource-rich countries because people have access to easy 
wealth, eliminating the need to become more productive. A second reason is the fact that 
abundance of natural resources leads to corruption, rent-seeking and poorer governance. 
A third reason is the Dutch disease, which claims that natural resources promote de-
industrialization. The authors find evidence that resource-rich countries have a higher 
ratio of the output of the non-tradable sector to the output of the tradable (non-resource) 
manufacturing sector and production of tradable commodities is concentrated in natural 
resources rather than in manufacturing. Finally, Sachs and Warner (2001) find evidence 
that countries rich in natural resources tend to be high-price economies and, partly as a 
consequence, they tend to miss export-led growth opportunities as well as other kind of 
growth opportunities. Additionally, high prices tend to attract less efficient producers. 
Our results indicate that tariffs affect negatively efficiency (𝛿3 > 0). Tariffs, as well 
as nontariff measures, are used by countries to control their imports, with the purpose to 
protect domestic industries and/or raise fiscal revenues. These measures constitute an 
obstacle to free trade. Several studies investigate the relationship between trade and 
 
8 It is important to stress that our sample includes only a small and distinct group of developing countries, 




productivity growth, namely the diffusion of technology from industrialized countries to 
less developed countries, the scope of learning-by-exporting, the benefits of trade 
evaluated by types of trade (imports versus exports), and the types of traded goods that 
contain more technology (e.g., Isaksson, 2007). One effect of trade liberalization that goes 
along with our results is the fact that it increases competition, which may encourage firms 
to reduce inefficiency by pushing them to use inputs more rationally, or, ultimately, force 
the least inefficient firms to leave the market. Consequently, average productivity of the 
sector as well as of the economy increases. Many other reasons are behind the result that 
trade liberalization affects productivity positively, namely the improved access to 
imported intermediate inputs of higher quality and variety; access to bigger markets, 
which facilitates the exploitation of scale economies and product specialization; and 
access to better technology embodied in intermediate and final imported goods. One of 
the components of trade, imports, is found to have highly significant positive impacts on 
productivity. Mayer (2001) analyzes imports as a mechanism to introduce foreign (and 
better) technology into domestic production, which enhances productivity. Isaksson 
(2001), on the other hand, finds that imports only contribute to the incorporation of better 
technology into domestic production and, consequently, to the improvement of 
productivity, if the importer country has the necessary absorptive capacity (for example, 
the required level of human capital). Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) favor this result, by 
arguing that even if developing countries have access to the same technology by 
importing it from developed countries, there would still exist differences in productivities 
due to the inadequacy of this technology to the characteristics of those countries (such as 
low absorptive capacity measured by the level of human capital). 
Although the variable life expectancy is significant only at 12.5%, our results show 
that health contributes positively to productivity and economic performance, given that 
higher life expectancy at birth influences efficiency positively (𝛿4 < 0). Life expectancy 
at birth is an indicator of the health status of a country. A healthy worker is expected to 
be more productive and, ceteris paribus, to contribute positively to economic growth. For 
an analysis of the direct and indirect effects of health on economic performance, see 
Bloom et al. (2004). Many empirical studies investigate the impact of health on TFP and 
economic growth (e.g., Cole and Neumayer, 2003; Gallup and Sachs, 2001; Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Barro, 1997; Knowles and Owen, 1995). Although, in general, 
authors seem to agree on the importance of health to economic growth, according to 
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Knowles and Owen (1995), the significance of this indicator varies across groups of 
countries. In fact, Knowles and Owen (1995) find that health is a very significant 
determinant of TFP, except in the case of the OECD countries. A possible reason for life 
expectancy to be statistically significant only at the 12.5% level of significance may be 
the fact that the majority of our sample is composed by OECD countries, which are 
expected to have similar levels of health standards. Consequently, life expectancy 
becomes a non-differentiating factor among this group of countries. 
A bad business environment, proxied by a high value of the variable time to resolve 
insolvency, influences efficiency negatively (𝛿5 > 0). Furthermore, a country with better 
governance is expected to be more efficient (𝛿6 < 0), ceteris paribus. The business 
environment and the governance of a country are defined by its institutions. In fact, good 
institutions are expected to set a good environment that promotes private investment, 
productivity and economic growth. Hall and Jones (1999) report that differences in 
institutions and government policies, which determines the social infrastructure of a 
country, are responsible for the majority of the differences in physical and human capital 
accumulation, productivity and output per worker across countries. Given that economic 
institutions are important to explain differences in economic growth of countries, 
Acemoglu et al. (2004) try to explain the variety of economic institutions across countries. 
They conclude that economic institutions determine not only the economic performance 
of a country but also the distribution of income among the different groups in the society. 
Thus, this will generate winners and losers and the choice of economic institutions is 
dependent on the political power of each of these groups. The distribution of the political 
power is then determined by political institutions (which allocate de jure political power) 
and the distribution of resources (which allocate de facto political power). Good economic 
institutions emerge when political institutions (i) allocate power to groups with interests 
in a broad-based property rights enforcement, (ii) impose real constraints on power-
holders, and (iii) when there are relatively few rents to be captured by power-holders 
(Acemoglu et al., 2004). Several other studies indicate the importance of institutions on 
TFP and economic growth, which support our results (e.g., Easterly and Levine, 2001; 
Rodrik et al., 2004; Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu, 2008; Afonso and St. Aubyn, 2013; 
Christie, 2014; Hu et al., 2014; Bayraktar and Moreno-Dodson, 2015). 
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It is widely accepted that innovation contributes positively to TFP and economic 
performance, evaluated both in levels and growth rates (e.g., Guellec and van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2001; Ulku, 2004; Abdih and Joutz, 2005; Hu et al.,2014). 
However, our results indicate that patents influence efficiency negatively (𝛿7 > 0 ), 
though with a very small magnitude. Two questions immediately arise from this result: 
Do patents really provide an incentive to innovate? Are patents a good proxy of 
innovation? Hall (2007) answers the first question by presenting new reasons why patents 
may in fact disincentive innovation, which contradicts the traditional view on patents. 
The traditional view supports the idea that patents encourage innovation. In fact, the 
inventor, by patenting its invention, is excluding others from using his/her invention for 
a limited time period, in exchange for revealing the description and implementation of 
the invention. This would, on one hand, incentive innovation, given that it prevents 
immediate imitation, and, on the other hand, the sharing of the invention’s secrets would 
help others to innovate more easily, based on the knowledge contained in the innovation. 
Instead, the idea that patents may discourage innovation is based on the fact that they tend 
to “increase the costs for subsequent innovators, especially when these innovators need 
to combine inventions from many sources” (Hall, 2007, pp. 6). The second question has 
been addressed by a few authors (e.g., Griliches, 1991; Breschi and Lissoni, 2001; 
Thompson and Fox-Kean, 2005; Shearmur, 2012), who state that using patents as a proxy 
of innovation may be problematic for a number of reasons: patents only register major 
product innovations, large firms may choose to patent for precaution (i.e. they may patent 
inventions that they don’t have the intention to place in the market just to keep others 
from doing it), small firms may choose not to divulge the secrets of their inventions or, 
simply, may not have the necessary means to acquire a patent. Notice that small firms 
tend to be the type of firms that are most associated with innovation (e.g., Hall et al., 
2009) and, therefore, using patents as its proxy may be truly misleading. 
Urbanization shows up in our model as statistically insignificant, although with the 
expected sign (𝛿8 < 0).
9 Empirical studies have shown that urbanization has a positive 
influence on TFP and economic growth through agglomeration effects, which contribute 
to the reduction of transaction costs and creation of economies of scale (Kumar and 
Kober, 2012). Indirectly, urbanization can be seen as a determinant of TFP growth, given 
that it favors the concentration of innovative activities and innovation (Shearmur, 2012), 
 
9 Our sample is not an ideal one to investigate the effects of urbanization. 
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which, as previously mentioned, is an important determinant of TFP growth. In fact, cities 
are conducive to the concentration of very diverse economic agents as well as a very 
diverse “ethnic, cultural and social fabric” (Shearmur, 2012), which are pre-requirements 
for innovation.  
Government debt is shown to have a negative impact on efficiency ( 𝛿9 > 0 ).  
Countries with lower government debt are expected to be closer to the frontier, ceteris 
paribus. Some studies (e.g., Pattillo et al., 2002; Schclarek, 2004; Checherita-Westphal 
and Rother, 2010) analyze the relationship between government debt and TFP growth 
and, hence, economic growth. In particular, Pattillo et al. (2002) find that the quality, 
rather than the level, of investment is an important channel through which growth is 
negatively affected by high levels of government debt. Specifically, the expectation of 
higher future taxation needed to repay the debt may distort the investment decisions 
towards, for example, short-run projects with a lower positive impact on productivity 
growth and, consequently, on economic growth.10  
The effect of the financial crisis on the efficiency of the 27-EU countries is negative, 
given that 𝛿10 > 0. Balakrishnan (2009), in particular, analyzes the impact of 88 banking 
crises on medium-term output growth, over the past 40 years for a large sample of 
countries. This study reports a persistent and substantive decrease of output after the 
banking crises. TFP is pointed out as the main responsible for the output losses observed 
in the short-run, although it recovers to pre-crisis levels in the medium-run. Nevertheless, 
Balakrishnan (2009) indicates some positive effects of the crises on TFP, which 
magnitude is not sufficient to overcome the negative effects. The negative effects are 
related to the more precautious attitude of the financial system in allocating funds, which 
may not be willing to lend resources to more productive and high-return but more risky 
projects. Notice that financial crises also have a negative impact on factor accumulation, 
given that funds available to invest decline. Additionally, less innovation associated with 
cuts in research and development may have negative impacts on productivity. Finally, 
lack of financing may affect high-productivity firms, which may be obliged to leave the 
market or to contract their operations. The positive effects of the crises on TFP are related 
 
10 The anticipation of higher future taxation by the taxpayers and the consequent increase on their savings 
is known as the “Ricardian equivalence”. 
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to a cleansing effect, where less efficient firms are forced to adopt more efficient 
practices, or even been forced to leave the market. 
Time is an important factor to explain differences in technical inefficiency across 
countries during 2001-2011, given that 𝛿11, is highly significant. The negative estimate 
of the time trend coefficient implies a positive evolution of the technical efficiency over 
time. This result is consistent with the findings of other empirical studies (e.g., Pires and 
Garcia, 2012). 
One last note on the determinants of inefficiency: no variable reflecting labor quality 
of each country is included in the technical inefficiency model. A labor force with a high 
degree of human capital (for example in the form of high levels of education) is expected 
to better acquire and use relevant knowledge. In fact, it is a crucial determinant of a 
country’s ability to innovate (Romer, 1990) and, especially for developing and least 
developed countries, it influences their capacity to adopt foreign technology, mainly 
developed in OECD economies, given that “many technologies are designed to make 
optimal use of the skills of these richer countries’ workforce” (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 
2001, pp. 563). Although, human capital is an essential variable, we do not include it in 
the inefficiency model, due to the fact that labor quality, measured as the index of human 
capital, is already incorporated in the stochastic production frontier production. 
Consequently, human capital influences directly the position of the stochastic frontier, 
rather than the position of the country in relation to the frontier. 
 
IV.3 Technical efficiency and returns to scale 
A ranking of countries based on technical efficiency and returns to scale (RTS) is 
presented in Table 5.11 Technical efficiency and returns to scale for each country are 
average values calculated for the overall period. Regarding the technical efficiency 
ranking, no country is fully efficient. The top of the ranking is occupied by European 
countries, led by Ireland. The bottom of the ranking is occupied by the emergent 
economies, as expected, where the less efficient country in the sample is Indonesia. South 
Africa is the only emergent country occupying the 30th position in the ranking, surpassing 
Slovenia, Portugal, Japan, Hungary and Czech Republic. This position may be explained 
 
11More detailed information regarding efficiency level per country in each year as well as output elasticities 
with respect to human and physical capital and average elasticity per country are presented in Appendix C. 
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by the relative low contribution of agriculture to the economy in comparison to the 
important contribution of more productive sectors, such as a well-developed 
manufacturing sector (agriculture value added corresponds to 3% of GDP in comparison 
to the 10% for the group of emergent economies). In addition, South Africa has a 
relatively good business environment, where the time necessary to resolve insolvency is 
approximately 2 years, in comparison to 3 years and 3 months for the emergent 
economies. Finally, the average number of resident patents applications per year in South 
Africa is one of the lowest in the sample. A somewhat surprising position is the one 
occupied by the United States, which assumes the 18th position in the ranking. A deeper 
analysis of the data indicates that the middle position that the United States occupies may 
be due to (i) the relatively high contribution of the natural resources rents to the economy, 
which is somewhat close to the OECD average (natural resources are responsible for 
approximately 1.4% of the American GDP versus 2.1% for the OECD countries); (ii) the 
relatively high level of protectionism, where the average tariff is 1.7% versus 2.3% for 
the OECD countries and 1.85% for the overall sample; (iii) the “just slightly” higher life 
expectancy than the OECD average (77.73 versus 76.91 years); (iv) the extremely high 
number of resident patents applications in comparison to the OECD average (215.000 
versus 25.500 patents, respectively); and (v) the relatively high level of government debt 
(52% versus 54% for the OECD countries). Therefore, the United States performance, 
evaluated in terms of the previous indicators, is close to the OECD average performance, 
which contradicts what we initially expected, that is, the United States occupying the top 
positions of the OECD ranking. Finally, Portugal shows up in the 32nd position out of 40, 
with a lower technical efficiency score than the sample average. The main drivers of the 
low technical efficiency of Portugal seem to be the low levels of governance (an average 
of 1.07 versus 1.3 for the OECD countries) and the high levels of public debt (74.5% 
versus 54% for the OECD countries). According to the OECD 2013 publication 
“Portugal: Reforming the State to promote growth”, Portugal lacks an efficient public 
sector capable of promoting a business environment that is more favorable to investment, 
job creation and innovation, in order to ensure a stronger private sector development. 
Additionally, Portugal needs institutional reforms that encompass greater sustainability 
of fiscal management. 
 
TABLE 5  
Rankings based on technical efficiency and returns to scale 
Rank  Country TE Country RTS 
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1 Ireland 0.89 South Africa 1.29 
2 Norway 0.83 Czech Republic 1.24 
3 Luxembourg 0.82 Indonesia 1.20 
4 United Kingdom 0.82 Luxembourg 1.14 
5 Sweden 0.78 Switzerland 1.12 
6 Canada 0.76 Finland 1.09 
7 Netherlands 0.75 Norway 1.09 
8 Belgium 0.75 Spain 1.06 
9 Switzerland 0.74 Israel 1.04 
10 Austria 0.74 Mexico 1.00 
11 Denmark 0.72 Brazil 0.98 
12 Finland 0.72 Belgium 0.97 
13 New Zealand 0.71 Germany 0.96 
14 France 0.71 Japan 0.94 
15 Australia 0.70 United Kingdom 0.94 
16 Germany 0.70 Sweden 0.93 
17 Israel 0.70 Austria 0.91 
18 United States 0.70 Turkey 0.89 
19 Italy 0.68 Denmark 0.89 
20 Spain 0.68 New Zealand 0.87 
21 Iceland 0.65 Italy 0.86 
22 Poland 0.65 France 0.86 
23 Estonia 0.63 Ireland 0.86 
24 Greece 0.63 India 0.83 
25 Mexico 0.61 Korea, Rep, 0.83 
26 Chile 0.60 Estonia 0.81 
27 Slovak Republic 0.60 Slovak Republic 0.78 
28 Korea, Rep. 0.59 Netherlands 0.76 
29 Turkey 0.59 Iceland 0.73 
30 South Africa 0.59 Portugal 0.71 
31 Slovenia 0.58 China 0.70 
32 Portugal 0.58 Hungary 0.59 
33 Japan 0.58 United States 0.59 
34 Hungary 0.57 Slovenia 0.52 
35 Czech Republic 0.53 Australia 0.50 
36 Russian Federation 0.48 Chile 0.45 
37 Brazil 0.39 Canada 0.43 
38 China 0.37 Greece 0.34 
39 India 0.30 Poland 0.31 
40 Indonesia 0.29 Russian Federation 0.22 
Overall Mean 0.64  0.83 
OECD Mean 0.68  0.82 
Emergent economies Mean 0.40  0.87 
 
Regarding the returns to scale ranking, some of the results are intuitive while others 
are not so intuitive. We expect top positions of the ranking to be occupied by countries 
that have relatively low levels of physical and human capital per worker, therefore 
characterized by increasing returns to scale. There are, however, countries that do not fit 
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the previous description. A closer analysis allows us to conclude that there are other 
reasons besides relatively low levels of physical and human capital per worker explaining 
increasing returns to scale. Specifically, a recent access to EU structural funds (Czech 
Republic), a very developed financial system (Switzerland), a high degree of innovation 
(Finland), and the presence of natural resources (Norway, Israel) may be sources of 
increasing returns in these countries.  
Relatively homogeneous European countries, such as Germany, Belgium, United 
Kingdom, France, Italy, Austria, Ireland and Sweden are concentrated in the middle of 
the table, with decreasing returns to scale. Those countries conciliate relatively high levels 
of physical and human capital per worker with high investment in innovation. The bottom 
positions are occupied by countries with very high levels of human and physical capital 
per worker (Australia, Canada, United States), with the clear exception of the Russian 
Federation. The last position occupied by the Russian Federation may be due to the 
extreme macroeconomic turbulence that characterized this country in the late 1990s, the 
weak institutional framework and governance, and the fact of being a major oil producer. 
For the particular case of Portugal, its mid-low position may result from the very low 
levels of human capital per worker and relatively high levels of physical capital per 
worker as well as the low level of resources allocated to innovation. 
IV.4 Decomposition of TFP change 
Table 6 provides a decomposition of economic growth into total factor accumulation 
(human and physical capital), change in TFP (technical progress, technical efficiency and 
scale effects), and random shocks.12 Emergent economies grew at a higher annual rate 
than OECD countries (approximately 4 times higher). This difference results from the 
fact that total factor accumulation is higher in emergent economies and the random shocks 
are positive. The random shocks for OECD countries are, on average, significantly 




Sources of economic growth by groups of countries, 2001-2011 
     
 




Variable Group of Countries 
Compound 
Annual % Rate* 
 
 
GDP per worker growth 
OECD Members 1.20  
 Emergent Economies 4.69  
 Difference**  -3.49  
 
       a) Total factor accumulation 
OECD Members 3.54  
 Emergent Economies 3.71  
 Difference**  -0.18  
 
            a.1) Human capital per worker  
            accumulation 
OECD Members 0.06  
 Emergent Economies 0.19  
 Difference -0.13  
 
            a.2) Physical Capital per worker  
            accumulation 
OECD Members 3.48  
 Emergent Economies 3.52  
 Difference -0.04  
 
        b) Change in TFP 
OECD Members 0.29  
 Emergent Economies 0.26  
 Difference 0.03  
 
            b.1) Technical change 
OECD Members -7.07  
 Emergent Economies -7.07  
 Difference 0.00  
 
            b.2) Change in technical  
                    efficiency 
OECD Members 8.16  
 Emergent Economies 7.67  
 Difference 0.49  
 
             b.3) Change in scale effects 
OECD Members -0.80  
 Emergent Economies -0.34  
 Difference -0.46  
 
        c) Random shocks 
OECD Members -2.62  
 Emergent Economies 0.72  
 Difference -3.34  
     
*This rate is calculated by taking a simple arithmetic mean of the compound annual rates of change of each 
variable over the countries that constitute each group. 
** The difference is calculated in terms of percentage points. 
 
As far as total factor accumulation is concerned, human as well as physical capital per 
worker accumulation is positive for both groups of economies, although the emergent 
economies exhibit higher rates of factor accumulation. Physical capital is the main 
contributor for the economic growth of both groups of countries, but not for the 
differences observed in the total factor accumulation between groups. This result is 
associated with the globalization process, in which physical capital can be easily 
accumulated through external financial resources as well as FDI. Human capital 
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accumulation is the main responsible for the difference observed in the total factor 
accumulation between groups, although with a small impact on economic growth.  
Regarding the components of TFP, results indicate that technical change affects both 
sets of countries in the same manner. As previously mentioned, this result is expected 
since technological change is Hicks-neutral. Technical efficiency improves over time for 
both sets of countries, and is approximately outweighed by technological regress. In fact, 
the improvement of the technical efficiency of countries can be explained, at least in part, 
by the downward shift of the production frontier. Although technological regress seems 
counterintuitive, several other studies also report it, even though the time period analyzed 
is much less controversial than the one in this study (e.g., Rao and Coelli, 1998; Deliktas 
and Balcilar, 2005; Pires and Garcia, 2012). Since the stochastic production frontier is 
unique and defined by the OECD countries, technological regress can be explained with 
globalization and the moving out of firms from OECD countries to other countries, 
namely emergent economies. Notice that the assumption of a unique production frontier 
is realistic under our framework given that the concept of Global Value Chains (GVCs) 
has emerged in the recent past, reflecting the increasing integration of the world’s 
production structure (e.g., Athukorala and Yamashita, 2006; Koopman et al., 2012; 
Cattaneo et al., 2013). Products are more and more “Made in the World” rather than made 
in a specific country.13 The change in scale effects contributes negatively to the TFP 
change of both groups of countries, although with a smaller magnitude for the emergent 
economies. This result, verified in both sets of countries, may be due to the positive rate 
of factor accumulation combined with decreasing returns to scale.  
TFP decomposition, presented in (4)-(10), allows to disentangling the explained part 
of the economic growth from the unexplained part – the random shocks – where the last 
component is obtained residually. Results indicate negative and significant random 
shocks for the OECD countries and positive shocks for the emergent economies. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In order to search an answer to the question “Why are some countries far richer than 
others?”, this study attempts to investigate (i) differences in technical efficiency between 
OECD and emergent economies, (ii) TFP change and its components, (iii) the relative 
 
13 The World Trade Organization launched the “Made in the World” initiative to better understand trade in 
the 21st century, strongly characterized by the existence of GVCs.  
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importance of TFP change and factor accumulation to economic growth and (iv) the 
contribution of random shocks to economic growth, obtained as a residual. The analysis 
is conducted using a stochastic frontier time-varying inefficiency model and a panel of 
40 countries, 34 of which are OECD-members and the remaining 6 are emergent 
economies, for the time period 2001-2011. 
Technical efficiency levels are estimated for each country in each year. No country is, 
on average, fully efficient. Environmental variables are important to explain differences 
in the technical efficiency levels. Specifically, a high contribution of the agricultural 
sector to the economy, a high value of natural resources rents, trade barriers, a bad 
business environment, a high number of patents, a high level of government debt and the 
financial crisis contribute negatively to technical efficiency. On the other hand, a good 
health status and good institutions help countries to be located closer to the production 
frontier.   
Economic growth is decomposed into factor accumulation (human and physical 
capital), TFP change and random shocks. TFP change is decomposed into technical 
change, technical efficiency change and scale effects, in order to evaluate the contribution 
of each component to differences in economic performance. The random shocks are 
obtained residually. Results show that emergent economies exhibit growth rates 
approximately 4 times higher than the OECD growth rates. Physical capital accumulation 
is the main contributor for economic growth showing similar rates of change for both 
groups of countries. Human capital accumulation exhibits higher differences between 
groups but a smaller impact on growth. Differences in TFP change between groups of 
countries are not significant. This result is in line with the neoclassical framework and 
contradicts the results of the recent economic growth literature, which advocates that 
differences in TFP change are the main contributors to the differences in the growth rate 
of GDP. Regarding the components of the TFP change, technical change affects both 
groups of countries in the same manner, resulting from the assumption of Hicks-neutral 
technological change. Results indicate an improvement of technical efficiency over time 
for both groups, with the OECD countries surpassing the emergent economies. Yet, 
technical efficiency change and scale effects are outweighed by technological regress. 
The technological regress is explained by the downward shift of the frontier of OECD 
countries – which defines the world frontier – caused by the delocalization of resources 




Given that emergent economies perform better in terms of growth rates of GDP per 
worker and total factor accumulation in 2001-2011, these economies may be under a 
process of catching up. Or, alternatively, these results may be due to this turbulent decade, 
which have had particular severe effects on OECD countries. In particular, the random 
shocks component favors this conclusion, given that these shocks affect the growth of the 
developed countries negatively. In addition, globalization in the decade means 
delocalization of firms and their productive activities from OECD countries to emergent 
economies. 
 
The assumption that there is no technological gap between the OECD and emergent 
countries in the sample may be strong, leading to an underestimation of the efficiency of 
emergent countries. Huang et al. (2014) propose a new approach in estimating 
metafrontier production functions, called the stochastic metafrontier analysis (SMF). This 
approach is based on a two-step SFA procedure that estimates, in the first step, the group-
specific frontiers and firm’s technical efficiency and, in the second step, the metafrontier 
and group-specific technology gap ratio, both under the SFA framework. This is a very 
interesting approach that allows separating random shocks from the technology gaps, 
which in turn can be specified as a function of environmental variables beyond the control 
of firms. 
However, it would not be appropriate to employ SMF in our study. The SMF requires 
the specification of a group-specific production frontier that may vary across groups and 
across time and the metafrontier envelops all individual groups’ frontiers. The sample, in 
our study, includes 36 OECD countries and 6 emergent economies in the time period 
2001-2011, which would naturally lead to two groups: OECD countries and emergent 
countries. The number of observations in the emergent economies group is not sufficient 
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Likelihood Ratio Tests 
We test for (i) the translog functional form where Ho is the Cobb-Douglas functional 
form with 𝛽𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝐾𝑡 = 𝛽𝐿𝑡 = 𝛽𝐾𝐿 = 𝛽𝐾𝐾 = 𝛽𝐿𝐿 = 0; (ii) the existence of technological 
progress, with 𝛽𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝐾𝑡 = 𝛽𝐿𝑡 = 0  as the null hypothesis; (iii) the type of 
technological progress, where 𝛽𝐾𝑡 = 0  is the Ho for Harrod-neutral technological 
progress, 𝛽𝐿𝑡 = 0 is the Ho for Solow neutral technological progress and 𝛽𝐾𝑡 = 𝛽𝐿𝑡 = 0 
is the Ho for  Hicks neutral technological progress;  (iv) the technical inefficiency being 
a linear function of the country-specific variables, where Ho is 𝛿0 = 𝛿1 = 𝛿2 = 𝛿3 =
𝛿4 = 𝛿5 = 𝛿6 = 𝛿7 = 𝛿8 = 𝛿9 = 𝛿10 = 𝛿11 = 0 ; (v) combinations of the previous 
restrictions. The results of these tests are presented in the next table. In addition, the 
presence of technical inefficiency in the model is tested by setting Ho equal to 𝛿0 = 𝛿1 =
𝛿2 = 𝛿3 = 𝛿4 = 𝛿5 = 𝛿6 = 𝛿7 = 𝛿8 = 𝛿9 = 𝛿10 = 𝛿11 = 𝜎𝑢 = 𝜎𝑣 . The presence of 
stochastic inefficiency effects is tested by restricting 𝜎𝑢 = 𝜎𝑣 = 0, which, by looking at 
the corresponding t-statistics, allows us to reject the null hypothesis.
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Harrod Neutral 0.04 ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ 
𝛽𝐾𝑡 = 0 𝜒
2(1) = 3.84**       
Solow Neutral 1.88 NC ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ 
𝛽𝐿𝑡 = 0 𝜒
2(1) = 3.84**       
Hicks Neutral 2.71 2.68 0.83 ______ ______ ______ ______ 
𝛽𝐾𝑡 = 𝛽𝐿𝑡 = 0 𝜒
2(2) = 5.99** 𝜒2(1) = 3.84** 𝜒2(1) = 3.84**     
Translog without TP 11.6* 11.56* 9.72* 8.89* ______ ______ ______ 
𝛽𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝐾𝑡 = 𝛽𝐿𝑡 = 0 𝜒
2(5) = 11.07** 𝜒2(4) = 9.49** 𝜒2(4) = 9.49** 𝜒2(3) = 7.81**    
Cobb-Douglas with TP  91.5* 91.46* 89.62* 88.78* NC ______ ______ 
𝛽𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝐾𝑡 = 𝛽𝐿𝑡 = 𝛽𝐾𝐿 = 𝛽𝐾𝐾 = 𝛽𝐿𝐿 = 0 𝜒
2(6) = 12.59** 
𝜒2(5) =
11.07** 
𝜒2(5) = 11.07** 𝜒2(4) = 9.49**    
Cobb-Douglas without TP 96.25* 96.21* 94.37* 93.54* 84.65* 4.75 ______ 
𝛽𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝐾𝑡 = 𝛽𝐿𝑡 = 𝛽𝐾𝐿 = 𝛽𝐾𝐾 = 𝛽𝐿𝐿 = 0 𝜒
2(8) = 15.51** 
𝜒2(7) =
14.07** 
𝜒2(7) = 14.07** 𝜒2(6) = 12.59** 𝜒2(3) = 7.81** 𝜒2(2) = 5.99**  
Translog with Inefficiency not being a linear 
function of z-variables 
231.79* NC NC NC NC ______ ______ 
𝛿0 = 𝛿1 = 𝛿2 = 𝛿3 = 𝛿4 = 𝛿5 = 𝛿6 = 𝛿7 = 𝛿8 = 𝛿9
= 𝛿10 = 𝛿11 = 0 
𝜒2(11) = 19.68**       
Hicks Neutral  with Inefficiency not being a 
linear function of z-variables 
231.73* NC NC 229.02* NC NC 0.24 
𝛽𝐾𝑡 = 𝛽𝐿𝑡 = 𝛿0 = 𝛿1 = 𝛿2 = 𝛿3 = 𝛿4 = 𝛿5 = 𝛿6
= 𝛿7 = 𝛿8 = 𝛿9 = 𝛿10 = 𝛿11
= 0 
𝜒2(13) = 22.36**   
𝜒2(11) =
19.68** 
  𝜒2(2) = 5.99** 
* An asterisk on the value of the test statistic indicates that it exceeds the corresponding critical value of the test statistic at the 5% level of significance for the 𝜒2-distribution and so the null 
hypothesis is rejected 





Elasticity of substitution 
The Allen partial elasticity of substitution (AES) between human per worker ℎ and 






             
where 𝐹 is the determinant of the bordered hessian matrix, 𝐹ℎ𝑘 is the cofactor of 𝑓ℎ𝑘, and  
𝑓ℎ and 𝑓𝑘 are the first partial derivatives of the production function f(.) with respect to  
inputs h and k, respectively.  
Given that 𝜎ℎ𝑘  depends on the quantity of the input factors, the elasticity of 






]                                       
Substituting the values in the matrix into  𝜎ℎ𝑘, we obtain an elasticity of substitution 






Efficiency levels by country and by group of countries, 2001-2011 
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Mean 
Australia 0.46 0.52 0.59 0.62 0.67 0.70 0.75 0.78 0.82 0.88 0.91 0.70 
Austria 0.50 0.57 0.62 0.67 0.72 0.77 0.81 0.84 0.83 0.88 0.90 0.74 
Belgium 0.53 0.60 0.65 0.69 0.73 0.76 0.81 0.84 0.83 0.88 0.88 0.75 
Brazil 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.38 0.41 0.45 0.48 0.52 0.55 0.39 
Canada 0.53 0.58 0.63 0.69 0.74 0.77 0.82 0.85 0.87 0.92 0.93 0.76 
Chile 0.41 0.44 0.46 0.50 0.54 0.62 0.66 0.70 0.71 0.76 0.81 0.60 
China 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.37 0.40 0.40 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.37 
CzechRepublic 0.41 0.45 0.41 0.44 0.47 0.49 0.55 0.58 0.59 0.68 0.70 0.53 
Denmark 0.50 0.57 0.59 0.64 0.68 0.73 0.81 0.84 0.83 0.88 0.91 0.72 
Estonia 0.47 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.62 0.65 0.68 0.68 0.66 0.70 0.76 0.63 
Finland 0.49 0.56 0.61 0.66 0.69 0.74 0.79 0.83 0.80 0.87 0.90 0.72 
France 0.54 0.59 0.62 0.64 0.68 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.79 0.83 0.87 0.71 
Germany 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.63 0.67 0.72 0.76 0.79 0.77 0.85 0.87 0.70 
Greece 0.47 0.52 0.55 0.58 0.61 0.64 0.66 0.70 0.70 0.74 0.77 0.63 
Hungary 0.42 0.49 0.51 0.54 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.65 0.69 0.57 
Iceland 0.44 0.49 0.52 0.59 0.62 0.63 0.67 0.72 0.75 0.84 0.89 0.65 
India 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.36 0.41 0.43 0.30 
Indonesia 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.33 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.29 
Ireland 0.66 0.78 0.88 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.89 
Israel 0.50 0.54 0.56 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.78 0.82 0.88 0.91 0.70 
Italy 0.51 0.54 0.58 0.61 0.64 0.68 0.72 0.77 0.76 0.82 0.84 0.68 
Japan 0.40 0.43 0.49 0.53 0.54 0.57 0.60 0.64 0.66 0.73 0.76 0.58 
Korea, Rep. 0.45 0.47 0.52 0.52 0.56 0.57 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.71 0.78 0.59 
Luxembourg 0.60 0.68 0.72 0.74 0.81 0.86 0.92 0.90 0.90 0.94 0.95 0.82 
Mexico 0.44 0.49 0.47 0.52 0.57 0.60 0.64 0.67 0.69 0.77 0.82 0.61 
Netherlands 0.54 0.60 0.64 0.68 0.74 0.77 0.82 0.85 0.84 0.88 0.91 0.75 
New Zealand 0.47 0.52 0.57 0.61 0.66 0.67 0.78 0.82 0.88 0.91 0.93 0.71 
Norway 0.59 0.62 0.69 0.76 0.84 0.88 0.90 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.83 
Poland 0.43 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.58 0.63 0.71 0.76 0.79 0.84 0.88 0.65 
Portugal 0.43 0.46 0.48 0.51 0.56 0.59 0.63 0.66 0.66 0.69 0.72 0.58 
Russian Federation 0.24 0.27 0.31 0.36 0.39 0.47 0.53 0.58 0.62 0.70 0.74 0.48 
Slovak Republic 0.43 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.63 0.68 0.69 0.74 0.79 0.60 
Slovenia 0.42 0.47 0.51 0.52 0.55 0.58 0.63 0.66 0.66 0.69 0.71 0.58 
South Africa 0.41 0.45 0.49 0.51 0.56 0.59 0.62 0.64 0.68 0.73 0.77 0.59 
Spain 0.50 0.55 0.58 0.61 0.65 0.68 0.70 0.75 0.76 0.80 0.84 0.68 
Sweden 0.55 0.62 0.67 0.74 0.79 0.81 0.84 0.87 0.86 0.91 0.94 0.78 
Switzerland 0.51 0.59 0.61 0.67 0.70 0.73 0.78 0.84 0.87 0.93 0.94 0.74 
Turkey 0.40 0.44 0.45 0.50 0.56 0.58 0.61 0.65 0.70 0.76 0.81 0.59 
United Kingdom 0.59 0.67 0.73 0.77 0.81 0.86 0.90 0.91 0.89 0.92 0.93 0.82 
United States 0.49 0.54 0.58 0.62 0.66 0.70 0.73 0.77 0.82 0.87 0.91 0.70 
Mean 0.46 0.51 0.54 0.57 0.61 0.65 0.69 0.72 0.73 0.78 0.81 0.64 
OECD Mean 0.49 0.54 0.58 0.62 0.66 0.69 0.73 0.77 0.77 0.82 0.86 0.68 





Output elasticity with respect to human capital, 2001-2011 
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Australia -1.00 0.47 0.57 -1.80 0.72 0.69 0.36 0.53 -0.11 0.30 -2.15 
Austria -1.45 0.48 0.15 0.45 0.34 1.02 0.26 0.98 -0.13 0.59 0.40 
Belgium -0.01 0.51 0.27 1.11 0.72 0.50 -0.94 -1.09 1.28 0.99 0.79 
Brazil 1.01 0.43 0.68 1.04 1.12 0.69 0.55 -1.91 1.13 -1.07 0.18 
Canada -1.02 0.60 0.51 -2.86 0.91 -0.24 0.67 -1.00 0.77 -1.13 0.60 
Chile -1.44 0.71 0.47 0.79 1.20 0.71 -2.59 -1.09 0.82 -1.47 0.40 
China -1.36 0.93 0.72 0.36 -2.11 0.72 0.33 0.48 0.29 0.95 0.52 
Czech Republic 0.89 0.07 0.38 0.78 0.63 1.19 0.32 1.12 0.76 0.84 0.93 
Denmark -0.80 0.28 0.43 -0.32 0.40 1.17 0.33 0.80 1.10 0.72 -1.01 
Estonia 0.95 0.08 0.33 -1.42 0.30 0.45 0.03 1.06 1.14 0.64 -1.22 
Finland 0.56 0.70 0.70 -1.14 0.24 0.85 1.04 0.95 0.65 0.60 0.58 
France 1.02 0.52 -2.47 -1.50 0.46 0.59 1.01 0.99 0.88 0.56 0.62 
Germany 0.73 0.32 0.73 -2.37 0.27 0.73 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.38 0.38 
Greece 0.84 0.36 0.86 -3.54 -0.20 -3.05 0.50 0.63 0.72 0.29 -1.73 
Hungary -2.68 1.07 0.80 0.52 0.73 -2.71 0.87 0.68 0.85 0.74 -0.24 
Iceland -3.37 0.31 0.79 0.44 0.67 0.82 0.60 0.65 0.32 0.62 0.00 
India 0.96 0.29 0.63 -0.83 1.56 -1.15 0.87 1.22 -0.32 1.08 -1.66 
Indonesia 0.34 0.40 1.05 1.02 1.55 0.67 0.35 0.77 0.77 0.25 -0.50 
Ireland 0.83 -0.10 0.97 -1.05 1.54 0.63 1.07 0.12 -0.33 -2.32 0.89 
Israel 0.39 -0.44 -0.58 0.79 1.52 1.09 0.87 -0.91 0.55 1.12 0.89 
Italy 0.54 -0.64 -0.16 0.87 1.50 0.41 0.15 0.89 -0.38 -1.31 0.86 
Japan 0.24 -0.05 -0.08 -1.20 1.47 0.43 -0.46 0.58 0.75 1.00 0.96 
Korea, Rep. 0.86 -0.14 1.38 -1.29 1.43 -2.20 -0.37 0.46 0.76 0.96 0.54 
Luxembourg 0.52 1.33 0.93 0.59 1.35 0.60 1.02 -0.86 0.97 0.57 -0.66 
Mexico 0.61 0.59 0.88 -0.34 1.30 0.67 0.44 -0.88 0.77 0.33 0.67 
Netherlands 0.43 0.60 -0.48 0.77 0.35 0.71 0.31 -0.91 -0.79 1.08 0.28 
New Zealand 0.44 0.13 0.60 0.50 0.27 0.42 -1.65 1.13 0.48 1.15 0.26 
Norway 0.72 0.04 0.83 0.70 1.39 -1.56 0.35 1.10 0.63 0.57 0.73 
Poland -0.02 -0.15 -3.46 0.59 1.33 -0.42 0.02 -0.09 0.72 0.28 -2.67 
Portugal -0.98 -0.85 0.65 0.82 0.36 0.18 -0.33 0.57 0.77 0.33 0.68 
Russian Federation 0.97 -0.96 -2.76 0.73 0.21 -1.21 -0.69 1.37 0.46 -3.16 0.55 
Slovak Republic 0.61 -0.95 0.52 0.74 0.09 0.72 -0.05 1.25 -2.25 0.67 0.28 
Slovenia -0.83 -1.19 -2.85 1.09 -0.04 0.63 -0.06 0.51 0.63 1.10 0.26 
South Africa 0.88 0.85 0.55 0.60 -0.12 1.05 0.01 1.24 0.50 1.05 1.17 
Spain 0.83 0.61 0.71 0.76 -0.16 -0.07 -0.01 -0.19 0.88 0.50 1.16 
Sweden 0.81 0.50 0.64 0.82 -0.77 0.81 0.95 1.30 -3.27 0.89 1.13 
Switzerland 0.61 0.46 0.57 0.38 -0.78 0.82 0.79 0.62 1.11 0.84 1.07 
Turkey 0.59 0.64 1.04 0.69 -0.88 0.57 -2.95 1.02 1.00 0.92 1.03 
United Kingdom 0.28 0.65 -0.13 -0.41 -0.57 0.51 0.54 0.88 0.03 0.82 1.01 





Output elasticity with respect to physical capital, 2001-2011 
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Australia 0.84 0.74 0.45 1.04 0.58 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.71 0.52 0.85 
Austria 0.95 0.74 0.54 0.70 0.48 0.54 0.43 0.62 0.70 0.42 0.76 
Belgium 0.75 0.72 0.52 0.44 0.39 0.33 0.79 0.86 0.50 0.61 0.64 
Brazil 0.60 0.74 0.38 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.41 1.06 0.55 0.89 0.89 
Canada 0.71 0.48 0.45 0.94 0.37 0.78 0.29 0.72 0.77 0.90 0.55 
Chile 0.72 0.45 0.47 0.61 0.42 0.59 0.91 0.70 0.48 0.65 0.47 
China 0.72 0.33 0.36 0.47 0.83 0.45 0.78 0.42 0.51 0.55 0.44 
Czech Republic 0.39 0.55 0.45 0.72 0.66 0.52 0.49 0.44 0.36 0.58 0.56 
Denmark 0.82 0.52 0.36 0.79 0.48 0.52 0.51 0.59 0.53 0.62 0.88 
Estonia 0.37 0.93 0.39 0.63 0.54 0.48 0.73 0.53 0.45 0.61 0.89 
Finland 0.49 0.38 0.59 0.70 0.54 0.59 0.58 0.55 0.54 0.61 0.68 
France 0.48 0.44 0.87 0.72 0.74 0.46 0.60 0.46 0.75 0.64 0.61 
Germany 0.57 0.51 0.48 0.85 0.85 0.48 0.61 0.51 0.76 0.71 0.75 
Greece 0.58 0.50 0.58 1.08 0.77 0.97 0.73 0.65 0.75 0.74 0.72 
Hungary 0.93 0.66 0.35 0.49 0.35 0.92 0.34 0.61 0.46 0.36 0.41 
Iceland 1.06 0.77 0.38 0.45 0.37 0.58 0.69 0.63 0.49 0.39 0.36 
India 0.32 0.77 0.70 0.78 0.51 0.55 0.55 0.41 0.68 0.54 0.66 
Indonesia 0.77 0.72 0.62 0.59 0.51 0.61 0.82 0.65 0.35 0.39 0.49 
Ireland 0.38 0.39 0.70 0.71 0.51 0.64 0.63 0.90 0.70 0.85 0.76 
Israel 0.46 0.47 0.50 0.43 0.51 0.46 0.70 0.81 0.58 0.50 0.75 
Italy 0.74 0.52 0.40 0.40 0.52 0.68 0.54 0.62 0.68 0.91 0.76 
Japan 0.52 0.68 0.71 0.71 0.52 0.68 0.79 0.35 0.75 0.61 0.43 
Korea, Rep. 0.58 0.69 0.45 0.72 0.53 0.85 0.80 0.38 0.77 0.36 0.59 
Luxembourg 0.46 0.47 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.66 0.59 0.84 0.43 0.35 0.71 
Mexico 0.48 0.42 0.46 0.70 0.58 0.48 0.69 0.85 0.50 0.42 0.37 
Netherlands 0.48 0.39 0.68 0.35 0.44 0.36 0.74 0.85 0.75 0.44 0.50 
New Zealand 0.78 0.51 0.66 0.43 0.47 0.48 0.71 0.51 0.43 0.44 0.40 
Norway 0.72 0.54 0.57 0.63 0.55 0.98 0.76 0.51 0.29 0.31 0.63 
Poland 0.74 0.59 1.07 0.65 0.57 0.79 0.35 0.69 0.58 0.40 0.90 
Portugal 0.71 0.48 0.67 0.41 0.44 0.53 0.44 0.42 0.57 0.48 0.46 
Russian Federation 0.62 0.50 0.95 0.48 0.49 0.88 0.53 0.45 0.68 1.00 0.36 
Slovak Republic 0.48 0.86 0.66 0.55 0.52 0.67 0.71 0.52 0.85 0.66 0.43 
Slovenia 0.83 0.89 0.96 0.51 0.56 0.40 0.69 0.42 0.32 0.50 0.42 
South Africa 0.57 0.58 0.66 0.39 0.58 0.70 0.68 0.53 0.69 0.53 0.53 
Spain 0.59 0.67 0.37 0.76 0.58 0.74 0.69 0.71 0.49 0.53 0.52 
Sweden 0.58 0.66 0.41 0.76 0.52 0.62 0.50 0.50 1.04 0.38 0.51 
Switzerland 0.66 0.73 0.40 0.47 0.52 0.41 0.60 0.39 0.50 0.57 0.53 
Turkey 0.62 0.31 0.61 0.53 0.52 0.48 0.96 0.56 0.55 0.48 0.54 
United Kingdom 0.75 0.64 0.75 0.67 0.70 0.37 0.65 0.55 0.54 0.50 0.55 






Annual average of output elasticities with respect to human ( ℎ) and physical capital 
( 𝑘) and returns to scale ( ) 
 
  Country ℎ 𝑘  
Australia -0.13 0.63 0.50 
Austria 0.28 0.62 0.91 
Belgium 0.38 0.60 0.97 
Brazil 0.35 0.63 0.98 
Canada -0.20 0.63 0.43 
Chile -0.13 0.59 0.45 
China 0.17 0.53 0.70 
Czech Republic 0.72 0.52 1.24 
Denmark 0.28 0.60 0.89 
Estonia 0.21 0.59 0.81 
Finland 0.52 0.57 1.09 
France 0.24 0.62 0.86 
Germany 0.32 0.64 0.96 
Greece -0.39 0.73 0.34 
Hungary 0.06 0.54 0.59 
Iceland 0.17 0.56 0.73 
India 0.24 0.59 0.83 
Indonesia 0.61 0.59 1.20 
Ireland 0.20 0.65 0.86 
Israel 0.48 0.56 1.04 
Italy 0.25 0.61 0.86 
Japan 0.33 0.61 0.94 
Korea, Rep, 0.22 0.61 0.83 
Luxembourg 0.58 0.56 1.14 
Mexico 0.46 0.54 1.00 
Netherlands 0.21 0.54 0.76 
New Zealand 0.34 0.53 0.87 
Norway 0.50 0.59 1.09 
Poland -0.35 0.67 0.31 
Portugal 0.20 0.51 0.71 
Russian Federation -0.41 0.63 0.22 
Slovak Republic 0.15 0.63 0.78 
Slovenia -0.07 0.59 0.52 
South Africa 0.71 0.59 1.29 
Spain 0.45 0.60 1.06 
Sweden 0.35 0.59 0.93 
Switzerland 0.59 0.53 1.12 
Turkey 0.33 0.56 0.89 
United Kingdom 0.33 0.61 0.94 























Australia 0.01 -0.06 2.02 1.53 -7.07 9.58 -0.98 -3.48 
Austria 0.48 0.10 2.14 0.67 -7.07 7.95 -0.21 -2.42 
Belgium -0.04 0.10 2.84 -0.50 -7.07 6.65 -0.09 -2.48 
Brazil 0.55 0.34 1.41 1.40 -7.07 8.50 -0.03 -2.61 
Canada -0.24 -0.27 2.05 -0.40 -7.07 7.68 -1.01 -1.62 
Chile 2.59 -0.20 4.73 0.42 -7.07 9.97 -2.48 -2.36 
China 7.68 0.21 9.31 -3.58 -7.07 6.36 -2.87 1.73 
Czech Republic 1.21 0.05 1.61 0.43 -7.07 7.10 0.39 -0.88 
Denmark 1.10 0.06 3.42 0.75 -7.07 8.21 -0.40 -3.12 
Estonia 4.34 0.06 6.88 -2.14 -7.07 6.27 -1.33 -0.47 
Finland 0.55 0.13 2.01 1.51 -7.07 8.38 0.19 -3.10 
France 0.70 0.17 4.70 -1.69 -7.07 6.06 -0.68 -2.49 
Germany 1.13 0.34 2.14 0.39 -7.07 7.55 -0.09 -1.74 
Greece 0.57 -1.24 9.40 -6.05 -7.07 6.40 -5.38 -1.55 
Hungary 2.00 0.02 6.49 -3.41 -7.07 6.29 -2.64 -1.10 
Iceland 0.59 0.16 1.22 2.95 -7.07 10.39 -0.37 -3.75 
India 6.29 0.27 5.96 4.74 -7.07 12.87 -1.06 -4.69 
Indonesia 3.55 0.43 3.24 1.59 -7.07 7.93 0.73 -1.72 
Ireland 2.97 0.10 8.35 -3.74 -7.07 4.54 -1.22 -1.75 
Israel -1.86 0.06 -1.05 0.93 -7.07 8.04 -0.04 -1.79 
Italy -0.51 0.12 2.47 -0.89 -7.07 6.54 -0.36 -2.22 
Japan 0.73 0.14 1.98 1.73 -7.07 8.91 -0.12 -3.12 
Korea, Rep. 2.35 0.14 5.26 -0.84 -7.07 7.16 -0.94 -2.21 
Luxembourg -0.87 0.14 1.41 -0.96 -7.07 5.88 0.22 -1.45 
Mexico 1.18 0.44 2.55 1.44 -7.07 8.51 0.00 -3.25 
Netherlands 0.96 0.05 4.28 -1.15 -7.07 6.97 -1.05 -2.22 
New Zealand -0.18 0.12 0.43 2.80 -7.07 9.94 -0.07 -3.53 
Norway 1.78 0.23 2.63 -0.43 -7.07 6.38 0.25 -0.65 
Poland 2.77 -0.27 3.65 1.00 -7.07 10.39 -2.32 -1.61 
Portugal 1.67 0.17 5.59 -1.83 -7.07 6.92 -1.67 -2.27 
Russian Federation 7.77 -0.40 -0.39 14.79 -7.07 21.24 0.62 -6.23 
Slovak Republic 3.39 0.02 3.99 0.55 -7.07 8.52 -0.90 -1.18 
Slovenia 0.88 -0.02 4.97 -2.77 -7.07 6.65 -2.35 -1.29 
South Africa 2.30 0.28 1.61 2.23 -7.07 8.75 0.55 -1.82 
Spain 1.75 0.28 5.25 0.00 -7.07 6.75 0.33 -3.78 
Sweden 0.89 0.08 2.14 -0.14 -7.07 7.07 -0.14 -1.18 
Switzerland 1.53 0.13 1.30 1.72 -7.07 8.63 0.16 -1.62 
Turkey 4.57 0.40 4.72 2.64 -7.07 10.25 -0.54 -3.19 
United Kingdom 0.46 0.14 3.84 -1.67 -7.07 5.66 -0.25 -1.86 
United States 1.37 -0.02 2.96 0.20 -7.07 8.48 -1.21 -1.76 
(1) Growth rate of GDP per worker. (2) Growth rates of human and physical capital per worker weighted by input expenditure share. 
(3) Obtained as a residual. 
 
